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Comments
DISPOSSESSION OF A TENANT
WITHOUT JUDICIAL PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The rights of a landlord and his tenant, when the landlord
attempts eviction without judicial process, have yet to be con-
clusively determined in Pennsylvania. The basic fact situation
assumed throughout this Comment is simple and commonplace:
the tenant's right to possession of the leased premises has termi-
nated' and the landlord undertakes to use self-help 2 to evict the
tenant. The rights and duties of the parties in such a situation
are unclear and may even be contradictory. This Comment will
explore the landlord's statutory and common law rights to use
self-help and examine the principal methods by which tenants
have heretofore attempted redress. In conclusion, a new remedy
1. This Comment will not discuss what constitutes termination of
the tenancy. In all cases it will be assumed that the tenant's right to
possession has terminated. For a detailed discussion of termination of
leaseholds, see generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.88, 3.89, 3.94,
3.97 (A. Casner ed. 1952); G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1315-19, 1325-
30, 1335-37, 1342-48, 1365-71, 1377-79 (1959 Replacement).
2. Self-help, of course, may take forms as varied as a verbal sugges-
tion to vacate or an expulsion by physical violence. When referred to
generally in the Comment, self-help shall mean any action except judicial
process by which a landlord attempts to evict a tenant. Examples of the
type of action contemplated include changing locks or otherwise bar-
ring the tenant's entry into the leased premises, removing the tenant's
furniture from the premises, discontinuing electricity, gas, water, and qther
utilities serving the leased premises, ordering the tenant to vacate by
threats of physical violence, or actually using physical force to expel the
tenant.
for tenants who find themselves the object of a landlord's self-
help will be discussed.
Basically, the determination of a landlord's right to use self-
help is made by reference to whether a landlord can be held
civilly or criminally liable for his act of entering upon the
leased premises.8 As most states deny any civil recovery on a
common law action of trespass,4 a tenant seeking redress must
bring his action under a statute creating a cause of action for
the landlord's entry.5 Since Pennsylvania has no such statute
and follows the majority rule, denying an action in trespass,6
it has been said that a landlord has the right to use self-help in
Pennsylvania.7 This necessary inverse logic may explain the
paucity of Pennsylvania cases on the subject and the confusion
among lawyers. Criminal liability for a landlord's use of self-
help is somewhat more settled in most jurisdictions, but, as will
be discussed later, the issue is definitely not settled in Pennsyl-
vania. This Comment will therefore avoid declaring that the
right to self-help exists without an explanation of the source, the
nature, and the limitations on that right.
Part II of this Comment will examine authorities in jurisdic-
tions wherein it has been said that a landlord has a right to use
self-help, with particular emphasis on the law of England and Penn-
sylvania. This view is held in what is probably the majority
of American jurisdictions and will be discussed as the "prevailing
doctrine." An annotation on this subject has discussed what it
calls the "modern doctrine," whereby a landlord entitled to posses-
sion of leased premises must resort to judicial process to gain
such possession or be liable in damages for his use of extra-judi-
cial process.8 This "modem doctrine" will be discussed in Part III.
Injunctive relief for the tenant will be discussed in Part IV.
II. THE PREVAIING DocTRNE
A. The English Rule
All American civil and criminal statutes regarding forcible
entry and detainer can be traced to the statute of Richard II,9 en-
acted in 1381. That statute, as quoted in a later case, provided:
3. See generally Annot., 6 A-L.R.3d 177 (1966). This annotation
thoroughly compiles the leading cases in each jurisdiction.
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 123 (4th ed.
1971).
5. For an example of such a statute, see, e.g., CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE
§ 1159 (West 1955), discussed at text accompanying notes 95-107 infra.
6. See, e.g., Overdeer v. Lewis, 1 W. & S. 90, 37 Am. Dec. 440 (Pa.
1841), discussed at text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
7. Annot. 6 A.L.R.3d 177, 183 (1966).
8. Id. at 179.
9. Statute of Forcible Entry, 5 Rich. 2, c.2 (1381).
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The king defendeth that none shall make entry on lands
and tenements but in cases where entry is given by law;
and in that case not with strong hand nor with multi-
tude of people, but only in a peaceable and easy manner. 10
This statute has been considered to be strictly criminal, creating no
civil cause of action for damages." Thus the present-day English
rule, both as regards civil and criminal liability, is in agree-
ment with the majority of American jurisdictions.
2
This precedent in the English law was altered slightly in the
second half of the nineteenth century. This alteration is of more
than historical interest, as it may explain much of the reasoning
found in Part III of this Comment. In 1840, Newton and his wife
sued Harland and another in trespass, alleging that the defendants
had acted tortiously in using force to expel the plaintiffs from
land the plaintiffs had leased from the defendant.' 3 The plaintiffs
admitted that their tenancy had terminated, but they asserted
that the defendant-landlord had no right to use force to evict them
from the land. Chief Justice Tindal of the Court of Common
Pleas began his discussion of the case by saying:
This case involves a queston of great importance and
one of very general application, namely, whether, after
a tenancy has been determined ... the landlord may en-
ter on the premises whilst the tenant still remains per-
sonally in possession, and after requesting him to depart and
give up the possession, and his refusing to do so, may turn
him out. . . by force, using as much force. . . necessary for
that purpose.'
4
In other words, the issue confronting the court was whether a land-
lord may use reasonable self-help to evict a tenant at the termina-
tion of a leasehold. The case was remanded for further findings
by a jury on the reasonableness of the force used.15 On remand,
however, three of the four judges indicated that the landlord did
not have the right to evict the tenants by force, whether reason-
able or not. Chief Justice Tindal said, "I do not see how the defend-
ants can justify the expulsion of the ...plaintiff ...by an act
which . . . is criminal."' 6 Justice Coltman, the dissenting mem-
ber of the court, attempted to meet this argument by saying:
the law will punish for the ...entry; but ...the tenant
...being himself a wrongdoer, ought not to be heard to
10. Newton v. Harland, 133 Eng. Rep. 490, 496 (C.P. 1840).
11. See, e.g., Taunton v. Costar, 101 Eng. Rep. 1060 (K.B. 1797).
12. See discussion at text accompanying notes 25-41 infra.
13. Newton v. Harland, 133 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1840).
14. Id. at 496.
15. Id.
16. Id.
complain in a civil action for that which is the result of his
own misconduct and injustice.
17
The statement by Justice Tindal may be summarized as holding
that in this case the landlord's actions give rise to a civil cause
of action against him if acted criminally. On the other hand
Justice Coltman contends that the plaintiff cannot recover because
both the plaintiff and the defendant acted wrongly, if not crimi-
nally. This basic argument recurs throughout the cases involving
self-help evictions and provides the essence of the controversy in
these cases.
Actually, the reason for the decision in Newton may have been
policy, as articulated by Justice Erskine when he said:
I cannot but apprehend that, if it were once established at
law that a landlord might, in all cases where his tenant
holds over, enter by force upon the premises and expel
the tenant . . . the peace of the country would be endan-
gered by the frequent resort to their summary proceedings.
18
This concept was somewhat expanded in the later case of Bed-
dall v. Maitland,19 one of the few cases to follow Newton, wherein
it was said:
This statute [the statute of Richard II] creates one of the
great differences which exist in our law between the being
in possession and the being out of possession of land ...
The effect of the statute is this, that when a man is in posses-
sion he may use force to keep out a trespasser; but if a tres-
passer has gained possession, the rightful owner cannot
use force to put him out, but must appeal to the law for as-
sistance.
20
This policy statement seems to. be the crux of any argument de-
nying a landlord's right to use self-help for eviction.
Newton v. Harland" and its progeny22 were specifically over-
ruled by a unanimous Court of Appeals in 1919 in Hemmings v.
Stoke Poges Golf Club, Ltd.23 When phrasing the issue in Hem-
mings, Lord Justice Scrutton said the case would decide
whether, if an owner of landed property finds a trespasser
on his premises, he may enter the premises and turn the
trespasser out, using no more force than is necessary,
without having to pay damages for the force used.
24
With such a phrasing of the issue, the answer "of course he may"
was not unexpected. Furthermore, such a phrasing seems to avoid
17. Id. at 498.
18. Id. at 499.
19. 17 Ch.D. 174 (1881).
20. Id. at 188 (Fry, J.).
21. 133 Eng. Rep. 490 (1840).
22. See Beddall v. Maitland, 17 Ch. D. 174 (1881); Edwick v. Hawkes
18 Ch. D. 199 (1881).
23. [1920] 1 K.B. 720 (1919).
24. Id. at 738.
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the point made by Chief Justice Tindal some eighty years earlier,
to wit, that the status of the plaintiff should not be considered an
affirmative defense available to the defendant; rather, the defend-
ant must justify his acts without resorting to an ad hominem plea.
Most authorities have maintained that the status of a tenant hold-
ing over does justify reasonable self-help efforts by the land-
lord.25 But it is submitted that the statement of the conclu-
sion is not persuasive of its reasoning.
The state of the English law regarding self-help on the part of
a landlord may be summarized as follows: A landlord is not sub-
ject to civil or criminal liability if his self-help tactics are peace-
able; he cannot be civilly liable if he uses reasonable force to re-
gain possession, although he may be held criminally liable; civil
liability on the part of the landlord arises only if he uses more force
than is necessary and reasonable to regain possession.
B. The Pennsylvania Rule
1. Civil Liability
The law in Pennsylvania regarding the civil liability of a land-
lord for his self-help actions has been stated as follows:
It is the duty of the tenant to give up the possession at the
end of the term. . . . The landlord may forcibly dispossess
the tenant as soon as the lease expires if he refuses to leave
.. .but he must use no more force than is necessary, and
do no wanton damage.
2 6
The cited authorities do not explain whether the landlord's right
is derived from his immunity from civil liability, criminal liability,
or both. However, the cases cited as supporting the rule indicate
that the statements are based upon the non-liability of the land-
lord in a civil proceeding.
The leading Pennsylvania case denying civil damages is Over-
deer v. Lewis 27 In that case, the plaintiff brought an action
against his landlord for damage done to plaintiff's personal prop-
25. See, e.g., 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150; COKE ON LIT-
TLETON § 57b; W. TRCKETT, LANDLORD AND TENANT 479, § 566 (1904).
26. W. TRICKETT, LANDLORD AND TENANT 543, § 633 (1904). See 22
PENNA. LAW ENCYC., Landlord and Tenant § 391 (1959) wherein it is
stated: "This right to use reasonable self-help is not in any way impaired
by the comprehensive Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951." See also Com-
ment, Analysis of Pennsylvania Landlord-Tenant Act of 1951, 13 U. PiTT.
L. REV. 396, 414 (1956) wherein it is stated: "The landlord may also re-
gain possession through self-help where the lease has expired ......
27. 1 W. & S. 90, 37 Am. Dec. 440 (Pa. 1841).
erty while the landlord was removing it from the leased premises
at the expiration of the plaintiff's term. The jury was charged
that, as the plaintiff was a tenant at will and subject to removal at
the defendant's pleasure, the landlord was liable only for dam-
ages caused by unnecessary violence on his part.28 In other words,
the trial court judge ruled that a landlord may use reasonable
force to evict a tenant at will, and the jury was charged to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the landlord's actions in this case.
Judgment was for the defendant and on appeal the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court affirmed per curiam:
[T]here could be no doubt that he was a tenant at will...
and the landlord might forcibly dispossess him on the in-
stant . . . with this limitation, only, that he should use no
greater force than might be necessary ... 29
Although Overdeer was seeking only to recover damages to his per-
sonal property, both the trial court and the supreme court ad-
dressed themselves to the issues of damages to plaintiff's personal
property and damages for the entry itself. As a result, all liti-
gants attempting recovery for the entry of a landlord must con-
front this precedent by dictum in Overdeer.
The plaintiff in Kellam v. Janson0 sought damages for tres-
pass from a purchaser of the land which he had leased and upon
which the alleged trespass took place. No damages to any person-
alty were alleged, and the status of the plaintiff as a tenant at will
was undisputed. The plaintiff obtained a judgment at the trial
court, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed on the basis
of Overdeer v. Lewis.3 1 The importance of the Kellam decision is
to be found in the court's statement that "an action is well-
founded only when a right is invaded; but the plaintiff's right
ceased by the entry of the defendant .... -32 Such a statement
seems to ignore the not-so-modern theory that liability is founded
on a breach of a duty,3 3 and not merely on an invasion of a right.
To say that a person's rights are dependent upon an arbitrary de-
cision by the very same person who owes the correlative duties
seems actually to be saying that there are really no rights at all.
34
28. Id.
29. Id. at 91, 37 Am. Dec. at 440.
30. 17 Pa. 467 (1851).
31. 1 W. & S. 90, 37 Am. Dec. 440 (Pa. 1841). "The case is completely
within the principle of Overdeer v. Lewis ...... Kellam v. Janson, 17 Pa.
467,469 (1851).
32. 17 Pa. at 469.
33. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TH LAw OF TORTS 1-7, § 1 (4th
ed. 1971).
34. Cf. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 5-9, 65-114
(Cook ed. 1923). In fact, Hohfeld's Jural Correlatives seem to indicate
that the tenant may have a "liability" if the landlord is said to have the
"power" to enter, as the Kellam court seems to hold. So according to the
real meaning of the court's decision the tenant in the situation discussed
here never did have a right, and therefore never had a cause of action.
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Once again the real question-the tenant's holdover status as bar-
ring the suit-was sidestepped.
There are very few recent Pennsylvania cases that deal with
the civil liability of a landlord when he uses self-help methods.
Furthermore, those cases that have been reported 35 do little more
than follow the statements of the previous authority. 6 It is sub-
mitted that that authority might be re-examined in light of the
criticism offered in this section and in those cases discussed in
Part III.
In addition to a consideration of the case law concerning civil
liability, a Pennsylvania landlord's "right" to use reasonable self-
help must be examined in light of certain statements in the Land-
lord and Tenant Act of 1951. 37 No authorities could be found
which held that the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 affected this
right of the landlord in any way. However, there are certain
ambiguous statements in the Act that could be used to support an
argument denying the right of self-help by a landlord. For ex-
ample, the title of the Act states that the Act relates to "the
rights, obligations, and liabilities of landlord and tenant ...
consolidating the law relating thereto." ' If, indeed, the legislature
was attempting to consolidate Pennsylvania Landlord-Tenant
law, it seems strange that in listing a landlord's remedies, 9 his
very valuable right of self-help was negligently omitted. It is
submitted that if the legislature had intended the landlord to
use self-help, the legislature would have given him the statutory
right to do so when all his other rights were being consolidated.
This legislative omission becomes even more significant when
it is noted that in Section 103 of the Act4 0 the legislature carefully
The court's conclusion may be stated in three different forms, but the
reasoning is never supplied except in this circular fashion.
35. See, e.g., Usnick v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation, 305 Pa.
355, 156 A. 245 (1931); Leidy v. Proctor, 97 Pa. 486 (1881); Rich v. Keyser,
54 Pa. 86 (1867); Strawbridge & Clothier v. Stiffles, 100 Pa. Super. 285
(1930).
36. Overdeer v. Lewis, 1 W. & S. 90, 37 Am. Dec. 440 (Pa. 1841)
is the major authority. See also authorities cited at notes 24-26 supra.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.101 et seq. (1951). See 22 PENNA.
LAW ENCYC., Landlord and Tenant § 391 (1959) wherein it is stated:
"This right to use reasonable self-help is not in any way impaired by the
comprehensive Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951."
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.101 (1951) (emphasis added).
39. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.301-313, 250.501-511 (1951).
Many of these sections are not law today, due either to legislative enact-
ment, judicial decisions, or judicial rule making power. The sections are
cited merely to indicate that in 1951 the legislature was indeed attempting
to consolidate the rights of landlords.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.103 (1951).
enumerated ten previously existing rights of landlords and tenants
that were not to be affected by the Act; the landlord's right to
use self-help in eviction is not among those listed. Of course
these sections do not provide any definitive answer as to the leg-
islature's intention, but it is submitted that they do raise some
question as to whether the legislature may have attempted to abol-
ish a landlord's right of self-help in 1951. The legislature's very
last words in the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 may provide an
answer to the question: " [ T] his act shall furnish a complete and
exclusive system in itself."'" It is submitted that this sentence
reflects the intent of the legislature to create a complete system for
adjudicating landlord-tenant dispues which should be considered in
ascertaining whether the landlord's right of self-help survived the
enactment of the Landlord and Tenant Act.
2. Criminal liability
In Pennsylvania forcible entry42 and forcible detainer 43 are
crimes. Whether the actions of a landlord using self-help eviction
methods come within the prohibitions of these statutes is an issue
that has perplexed the courts to some degree.
The statements in an early case 44 heard before a Pennsyl-
vania County Court seem to indicate that a landlord attempting
to evict his tenant by self-help might have been subject to indict-
ment for his acts. That court said:
[W]hatever right . .. the man who makes the entry may
have,. . . he commits a crime. . . if he enter with force on
a person having no right. . . . [T] he person forcibly dis-
possessed . . . is taken under the protection of the
law .... 45
The facts in this case are not set out in the report, but it is sub-
mitted that this quoted language could support the conclusion
that the owner of the land was being tried for forcible entry46
upon that land. Of course, any prosecution for forcible entry must
prove force, and this court gave a rather all-encompassing defini-
tion of force, saying:
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.602 (1951).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4403 (1939) provides, inter alia:
Whoever, with violence and a strong hand, or circumstances of
terror, enters upon or into any lands or building, or after entering
peaceably, turns out by force or by threats, or menacing conduct,
the party in possession, is guilty of a forcible entry ...
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4404 (1939) provides, inter alia:
Whoever, by force and with a strong hand, or by menaces or
threats, unlawfully holds and keeps possession of any lands or
tenements, whether the possession was obtained peaceably, or
otherwise, is guilty of forcible detainer. ...
44. Pennsylvania v. Robison, 1 Addis. 14 (Pa. C.P. 1791).
45. Id. at 15.
46. It is further submitted that the elements of forcible entry were
the same in 1791 as at present. Compare the text of the statute of
Richard II, quoted at text accompanying note 9 supra with the text of
Pennsylvania's present statute, quoted at note 42 supra.
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[T]here must be at least such acts of violence or such
threats, menaces, signs or gestures as may give ground to
apprehend personal injury or danger in standing in defence
of the possession.
47
This definition, and the reasoning behind it, becomes more im-
portant when the several twentieth century cases are analyzed.
48
The case of Commonwealth v. Kensey, 49 decided in 1846, pre-
sents a detailed discussion of the history of the law of forcible entry
and explains the distinction between civil and criminal liability.
In that case, the defendant was being prosecuted for forcibly
expelling his tenant; the force consisted of five men carrying
the female tenant out of the premises at the direction of the defend-
ant. 50 Ruling on a motion for a new trial after defendant's convic-
tion, the court took note of the many civil cases51 cited as prece-
dent for granting the landlord a right to use reasonable force to
evict a tenant at will. 52 The court, however, recognized that these
cases were civil and proposed the distinction stating:
[T] hough the entry of [a landlord] be lawful.., so that
he cannot in any case be punished in an action at the com-
mon law, yet the lawfulness of his entry no way excuses
the violence or lessens the injury done . . . and conse-
quently an indictment of forcible entry. . . is good.
5 3
In other words, this court, as have most others, is declaring that
the liability of the defendant for his acts depends entirely on who
is suing. The tenant cannot maintain the suit because he is a
wrongdoer, even though he may have suffered damages; rather,
the suit must be brought by the Commonwealth on behalf of the
people for they have suffered a damage to the public peace and they
have done no wrong. The landlord's liability is made to depend
47. Pennsylvania v. Robison, 1 Addis. 14, 16 (Pa. C.P. 1791).
48. See text accompanying notes 56-82 infra.
49. 2 Par. Eq. Cas. 401 (Pa. 1846).
50. The court quoted the statute upon which the prosecution was
based:
Whoever shall violently or forcibly enter into the house or posses-
sion of any other person . . . shall be punished as a breaker of
the peace.
The court said this statute was passed in the year 1700. Commonwealth
v. Kensey, 2 Par. Eq. Cas. 401, 405 (Pa. 1846).
51. Pennsylvania v. Robison, 1 Addis. 14 (Pa. C.P. 1791), discussed at
text accompanying notes 44-48 supra, was not cited in this case.
52. Overdeer v. Lewis, 1 W. & S. 90, 37 Am. Dec. 440 (Pa. 1841) and
Newton v. Harland, 133 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1840) were the major authori-
ties presented. Newton v. Harland was, of course, the law in England at
that time, but the court in the instant case, probably recognizing its doubt-
ful validity, referred mainly to the dissenting opinion in Newton.
53. Commonwealth v. Kensey, 2 Par. Eq. Cas. 401, 409 (Pa. 1846).
absolutely on the status of the person initiating the action against
him. The defendant-landlord in Commonwealth v. Kensey5 4 was
held criminally liable for forcible self-help tactics, the court stating
that Pennsylvania law was thereby brought into conformity with
the law of England. 55 Interestingly, the Kensey court did not dis-
cuss what degree of force was required to be proven to come within
the statutory prohibition. The court simply held that the defend-
ant's acts in this case were of such degree.
In 1914, in the case of Commonwealth v. Everheart,6 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court was forced to resolve the issue of
the type of force prohibited by the statute. 57 Citing the opinion in
the trial court"' as the opinion of the Superior Court, it was held
that:
[T] here need not be actual terrorization of the occupants
of a dwelling house to constitute the offense. . . . [There
need be only] force sufficient to alarm, so as to cause sur-
render of possession, or to provoke a breach of the peace
[citation omitted] .59
Such a definition would seem to include almost any act of self-help
a landlord could attempt.
Commonwealth v. Everheart ° is a valuable case in the study
of a landlord's civil and criminal liability for his self-help meth-
ods. The opinion deals extensively with the reasons for the pas-
sage of the original forcible entry statute in 1381,61 and it traces the
development of the distinction between civil and criminal liability,
both in England and in Pennsylvania. The case arose after Yohn,
the prosecuting witness, was discharged from his employment with
the defendant about January 1, 1913. As an incident of his em-
ployment, Yohn had been given a house to live in, and at the time
he was discharged, he was also notified to vacate the house. De-
54. 2 Par. Eq. Cas. 401 (Pa. 1846).
55. "[W]e place [the rule] upon the ground where the English judges
have. to both civil and criminal cases. . . ." Commonwealth v. Kensey,
2 Par. Eq. Cas. 401, 408 (Pa. 1846). As discussed in note 52 supra, this
statement by the court acknowledges that Newton v. Harland, 133 Eng.
Rep. 490 (C.P. 1840) was probably not an accurate statement of the Eng-
lish law.
56. 57 Pa. Super. 192 (1914).
57. The forcible entry statute in effect in 1914 provided, inter alia:
If any person shall with violence and a strong hand enter upon
or into any lands or buildings . . . by any kind of violence, or
other circumstances of terror, or if any person after entering
peaceably, shall turn out by force or threats, or menacing conduct,
the party in possession, every person so offending shall be guilty
of a forcible entry ...
Act of 1860, March 31, P.L. 382, § 21 (1860). Compare the "modern"
statute quoted in note 42 supra and the 1381 statute quoted at text accom-
panying note 10 supra.
58. This opinion was written by Judge Seibert, President Judge of
the Court of Quarter Sessions of Perry County.
59. Commonwealth v. Everheart, 57 Pa. Super. 192, 206 (1914).
60. 57 Pa. Super. 192 (1914).
61. Id. at 198-99.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
spite repeated demands by the defendant to vacate, Yohn and his
family were still in the house on July 1, 1913. On that day, the de-
fendant and others broke in a window of the house and removed
all of Yohn's furniture. Yohn's wife and children were in the house
the entire time, but "no violence was done or offered to be done
.- 62 to any of the family. The court said that "In an indictment
for a forcible entry, neither [title nor the right of possession]
comes into question, but the possession only and the force."'63 After
defining the requisite amount of force,64 the court said:
To hold that the facts established by undisputed testi-
mony in this case amounted to no more than a trespass,
would be to disregard the plain language of the act, do vio-
lence to its spirit and destroy its remedial purpose.
65
The defendant-landlord was consequently convicted of the crime
of forcible entry.
The Superior Court appeared to forget Everheart, however, in
its decision of Commonwealth v. Leibowitz.6 6 In that case, the
tenant admitted that his right to possession had expired and testi-
fied that the landlord-defendant "chased me out of the store"
6 7
saying "you better get out of here. '68 The landlord then gained
access to the premises by hiring a locksmith to pick the lock. The
landlord was convicted of forcible entry at trial, and the Superior
Court reversed, ruling that "there was an absence of violence...
or other circumstances to cause terror necessary to bring the
defendant's conduct within the statute."6 9  It is submitted that
Everheart and Leibowitz cannot be distinguished. In Everheart,
where a landlord's conviction of forcible entry was sustained, the
court carefully pointed out that "no violence was done or offered
to be done . . ." to anyone;7 0 in Leibowitz, however, the conviction
was reversed, even though the landlord explicitly threatened to use
violence.7 1 Furthermore, the facts recited by the Leibowitz court
seem to fall into that court's definition of violence: "such conduct
as is calculated to alarm the most timid. '7 2 It is submitted that a
62. Id. at 195.
63. Id. at 203, citing Pennsylvania v. Robison, 1 Addis. 14 (1791).
64. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
65. Commonwealth v. Everheart, 57 Pa. Super. 192, 207 (1914).
66. 103 Pa. Super. 479, 157 A. 219 (1931).
67. Id. at 480, 157 A. at 220.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Commonwealth v. Everheart, 57 Pa. Super. 192, 195 (1914). See
text accompanying note 62 supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
72. Commonwealth v. Leibowitz, 103 Pa. Super. 479, 480, 157 A. 219,
220 (1931).
finding that a person was chased from a place 73 is inconsistent with
a finding that he was not alarmed. It is submitted, therefore, that
Commonwealth v. Leibowitz7 4 is of doubtful validity.7 5
In Commonwealth v. Bauer,76 the Erie county court attempted
to distinguish Commonwealth v. Everheart7 7 and Commonwealth
v. Leibowitz.18 Both counsel in Bauer indicated that they thought
Everheart and Leibowitz inconsistent, 79 but the court held there
was no inconsistency. In distinguishing the two, the court relied on
the presence of the tenant's wife as justifying conviction in Ever-
heart and the absence of anyone in Leibowitz as justifying reversal
of conviction.80 Such reasoning not only ignores the statement
of the Everheart court that the tenant's wife was never threat-
ened by or in fear of any violence,8 ' it also ignores the reason why
the tenant was absent in Leibowitz-he had been chased away
by the threats of the defendant.8 2 It is submitted that the distinc-
tion made by the court in Bauer is one without a difference.
In light of the foregoing, and other reported decisions, 3 it is
submitted that a landlord in Pennsylvania commits a crime if he
forcibly enters upon any real estate even though he may have a
right to possession of that real estate. The definition of force as
"such conduct as is calculated to alarm the most timid"8 4 or "suffi-
cient to alarm"8 5 or "calculated to prevent resistance"8' 0 seems to be
settled. The force necessary to sustain a conviction seems to be
slight indeed, and the definitions appear to encompass most self-help
tactics commonly used by landlords. Several courts, however, seem
to have decided that the force must be of a higher degree than
73. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
74. 103 Pa. Super. 479, 157 A. 219 (1931).
75. It may be argued that the Leibowitz court was concerned with
violence to the property in question, rather than violence to the person.
Only such an argument can be used to distinguish Leibowitz from Ever-
heart; in the latter a window was broken, whereas in the former the lock
was picked open. However, the Leibowitz court, as have all other courts
considering criminal liability for forcible entry, indicated that violence to
the person is the essence of the crime by defining violence as "such conduct
as is calculated to alarm the most timid." Commonwealth v. Leibowitz,
130 Pa. Super. 478, 480, 157 A. 219, 220 (1931).
76. 65 Pa. D. & C. 281 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
77. 57 Pa. Super. 192 (1914).
78. 103 Pa. Super. 479, 157 A. 219 (1931).
79. Commonwealth v. Bauer, 65 Pa. D. & C. 281, 283 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
80. Id.
81. Commonwealth v. Everheart, 57 Pa. Super. 192, 195 (1914). See
text accompanying note 62 supra.
82. Commonwealth v. Leibowitz, 103 Pa. Super. 479, 480, 157 A. 219,
220 (1931). See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
83. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sacarakis, 196 Pa. Super. 455, 175
A.2d 127 (1961); Commonwealth v. Tillia. 73 Pa. Super. 376 (1920); Com-
monwealth v. Shaffer, 32 Pa. Super. 375 (1907).
84. Commonwealth v. Leibowitz, 130 Pa. Super. 478, 480, 157 A.
219, 220 (1931).
85. Commonwealth v. Everheart, 57 Pa. Super. 192, 206 (1914).
86. Pennsylvania v. Robison, 1 Addis. 14, 16 (Pa. C.P. 1791).
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specified in these definitions before a conviction can be sustained.8 7
These conflicts in the case law prevent any realistic statement of the
extent of a landlord's criminal liability for his self-help methods.
III. THE MODERN DOCTRINE
An annotation on the subject of a landlord's self-help remedies
has said that many jurisdictions adhere to the rule that
a landlord otherwise entitled to possession must, on the re-
fusal of the tenant to surrender the leased premises, re-
sort to the remedy given by law to secure it; otherwise he
would be liable in damages for using force or deception to re-
gain possession.""
That annotation presents a complete list of the jurisdictions follow-
ing this rule; the rationale of several of those leading cases will be
discussed herein.
California is perhaps the leading jurisdiction which subjects
a landlord to civil liability if he resorts to self-help eviction meth-
ods. The case of Jordan v. Talbot 9 is most often cited for this
proposition, but civil liability of the landlord was established in Cal-
fornia well before this case was decided. As early as 1859 no less a
person than the Governor of the State was determined to be
civilly liable for the self-help methods used by him in gaining
possession of land to which he admittedly had the right of posses-
sion.9 0 The court said:
Questions of title or right of possession cannot arise; a
forcible entry upon the actual possession of plaintiff being
proven, he would be entitled to restitution, though the
fee simple, title, and present right of possession, are shown
to be in the defendant.
9 1
The court further said "The authorities on this point are numer-
ous and uniform, '92 although none are cited.
The civil action of the plaintiff in McCauley v. Weller9 3 was
probably based on a criminal statute.9 4 The court didn't discuss
87. See Commonwealth v. Leibowitz, 103 Pa. Super. 479, 157 A. 219
(1931); Commonwealth v. Bauer, 65 Pa. D. & C. 281 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
88. Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177, 186 (1966).
89. 55 Cal. 2d 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20 (1961).
90. McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500 (1859).
91. Id. at 525.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The only mention of any statute in the report of the case appears
in the argument of the counsel for appellee-plaintiff. He quotes the stat-
ute as saying:
No person or persons shall hereafter make any entry into lands,
whether the action can be maintained as a common-law action of
trespass, ignoring the historical distinction between civil and crim-
inal liability as previously discussed.9 5 This problem was elimi-
nated in California in 1872, however, when the legislature enacted a
statute creating a civil cause of action for forcible entry.9 6
There is a great deal of authority in California for the proposi-
tion articulated in McCauley,97 but the leading case is Jordan v.
Talbot.98 Justice Traynor, writing for the majority in Jordan, in
essence ruled that Section 1159 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which creates a civil cause of action for forcible entry99 should be
construed to include entries made by landlords after a leasehold
on their property has terminated. This holding is based on the fact
that a right of re-entry is not expressly made an affirmative de-
fense to an action on the statute, and such a defense cannot be
implied from the history, purpose, and background of the statute.100
In other words, since a landlord is neither expressly nor impliedly
excluded under the statute, he must be included as being liable.
The landlord in Jordan v. Talbot entered the premises in the
tenant's absence by means of a pass-key. He removed all of the
tenant's furniture to a warehouse, and when the tenant returned,
she was prevented from entering the premises. 101 The court ruled
that such actions violated both sections of the statute; 0 2 the use of
force is implied in an entry made upon land in the possession of an-
tenements, or other possessions, but in cases where entry is given
by law, and in such cases, not with strong hand nor with multi-
tude of people, but only in a peaceable manner; and if any person
henceforth do the contrary, and thereof be duly convicted, he shall
be punished by fine.
McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500, 522 (1859).
95. It is interesting, if not significant, to note that the historic Eng-
lish case allowing civil recovery in an action of trespass for a landlord's
forcible entry was the law of England at the time the California case was
decided. See Newton v. Harland, 133 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1840), overruled
by Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, Ltd., [1920] 1 K.B. 720 (1919),
However the English cases are not cited in the decision of the California
Supreme Court.
96. CAL. Crv. Po. CODE § 1159 (West 1955).
97. See, e.g., Karp v. Margolis, 159 Cal. App. 2d 69, 323 P.2d 557
(1958); Eichhorn v. De La Cantera, 117 Cal. App. 2d 50, 255 P.2d 70 (1953);
Pickens v. Johnson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 778, 238 P.2d 40 (1952); Gilbert v.
Peck, 162 Cal. 54, 121 P. 315 (1912); Kerr v. O'Keefe, 138 Cal. 415, 71 P. 447
(1903); Baker v. Dickson, 62 Cal. 19 (1882); Henderson v. Grewell, 8 Cal.
581 (1851).
98. 55 Cal. 2d 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20 (1961).
99. CAL. Cirv. PRO. CODE § 1159 (West 1955) provides:
FORCIBLE ENTRY DEFINED. Every person is guilty of a forci-
ble entry who either:
1. By breaking open doors, windows, or other parts of a
house, or by any kind of violence or circumstance of terror enters
upon or into any real property; or,
2. Who, after entering peaceably upon real property, turns
out by force, threats, or menacing conduct, the party in possession.
100. Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 603, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 491,
361 P.2d 20, 23 (1961).
101. Id. at 598, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 490, 361 P.2d at 22.
102. CAL. CIT. PRO. CODE § 1159 (West 1955).
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other if such entry is in his absence and without his consent, and
furthermore, the plaintiff was prohibited from entering the prem-
ises after the landlord took possession, thus violating section two
of the statute.10 3 In other words, the landlord's actions in entering
the premises were forcible, thus violating section one, 104 and by
turning out the tenant by force after his entrance, the landlord
violated section two.
10 5
Four justices concurred in Justice Traynor's opinion in Jordan
v. Talbot, and three justices joined in Justice Schauer's dissent.
The majority opinion, in ruling that title or right to possession is
not relevant in a forcible entry action, necessarily ruled that the
plaintiff's status was likewise irrelevant. In fact, the decision
is significant for its lack of any discussion attempting to justify
the plaintiff's actions before commencement of the suit. 06 Al-
though the dissent attacked the holding of the court on two bases,
neither one directly discussed the tenant as any type of wrong-
doer. Primarily, the dissent argued that the majority was impairing
the obligations of contract:
Tenants and property owners may agree that the latter
shall have some rights ...and where such rights can be
exercised peaceably, it seems to me only common and ele-
mentary justice that the courts uphold them.
07
The dissent also cited several cases from California and other juris-
dictions as supporting the rule that a landlord may use reasonable
self-help methods without incurring civil liability.1 08
It is submitted that the basic reason for the decision in Jor-
dan v. Talbot was the California statute which allows a lessor to ob-
tain possession of any real property within just three days. 09 As
Justice Traynor said, "This remedy is a complete answer to any
claim that self-help is necessary." 110 Many of the cases in other
103. Id.
104. Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 606-7, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492-3,
361 P.2d 20, 24-5 (1961).
105. Id. at 609, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 494, 361 P.2d at 26.
106. It appears from the facts that the plaintiff was at least two months
in arrears in rent payments and that one personal check for the rent had
been dishonored by the bank.
107. Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 619, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 499,
361 P.2d 20, 31 (1969) (dissenting opinion). There was a provision in
the lease that the landlord should have the right to take possession upon
violation of the terms of the lease. 55 Cal. 2d 597, 612, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488,
496-7, 361 P.2d 20, 28-9 (1961).
108. Id. at 615, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 497-8, 361 P.2d at 29-30 (dissenting
opinion).
109. CAL. Cr. PRO. CODE § 1161 (West 1955).
110. Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 605, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492,
361 P.2d 20, 24 (1961).
jurisdictions rely on the landlord's speedy and efficient legal rem-
edy for regaining possession as justification for granting a tenant
a civil cause of action for a landlord's extra-judicial efforts."' It
is submitted that the availability of such a remedy for a landlord
in Pennsylvania may justify enjoining the landlord from using
self-help eviction methods.
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR THE TENANT
The Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951112 created
a procedure whereby a landlord could recover possession of any
premises held by a tenant after the expiration of the tenancy." 3
This procedure could be utilized to return possession to the land-
lord within a minimum of twenty-five days and a maximum of forty
days." 4 These sections of the Landlord and Tenant Act have been
greatly changed in the past year by the Minor Court Civil Proce-
dural Rules Committee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.1 5 Be-
cause of these changes, a landlord may now have to wait from
thirty-five to fifty days to regain possession."16 This section of the
Comment will assume that the thesis outlined in Part III is the
better reasoned approach to the issue of self-help by the landlord.
It is submitted that since the legislature has provided a remedy
for a landlord to regain the possession of leased premises, the land-
lord may not use extra-judicial methods. Proceeding from such
an assumption, this section will propose that a tenant should be
permitted to enjoin self-help eviction methods attempted by his
landlord."
7
111. See, e.g., Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304 (1854) ("... a posses-
sion, commenced under a tenancy, cannot be put an end to in fact, by
forcibly removing the tenant without process."); Adelheim v. Dougherty,
129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937) ("The law provides an adequate and
speedy remedy for the acquisition of possession of premises which are
wrongfully held by another. . . ."); Farwell v. Warren, 51 Ill. 467 (1869)
("The law has given him an action of ejectment or a forcible entry and
detainer. The law, for wise and salutary purposes, has always prevented
a party, with violence or force, from adjusting his imaginary or even real
wrongs."). See W. B ErT'r, When the Landlord Resorts to Self-Help,
19 FLA. L.R. 238 (1966) for a complete analysis of the law in Florida on
this point.
112. PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 68, § 250.101 et seq. (1951).
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.501-511 (1951).
114. Actually possession may possibly have been regained in ten days
if the lease provided that the tenant waived his statutory right to have
notice to vacate.
115. See Rules of Conduct, Office Standards and Procedure for Jus-
tices of the Peace, Rules 501-582 (1971). These rule changes are explained
in CALDWELL & Aci.RoYD, Recent Changes in Practice Before Justices Of
The Peace, 43 PENNA. B.A.Q. 39 (1971).
116. These figures assume that the tenant is able to take advantage of
the many time periods specified. It's possible that the landlord evicting
by judicial process may regain possession within seven days.
117. Several cases have discussed the propriety of an injunction pre-
venting an eviction action from being maintained before a magistrate be-
cause of fraud, because an intricate legal question is involved, or because
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In Berman v. City of Philadelphia,"8 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court enjoined the Philadelphia Police Force from using a type
of self-help eviction method. The police apparently thought the ap-
pellants businesses were violating a zoning ordinance, so, at the
direction of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, city employees
cut all telephone and electricity lines leading into the building and
changed the locks. A policeman was then stationed in front of the
building with instructions to refuse to allow the appellants to enter.
The day before this "eviction," the appellants had been denied a
preliminary ex parte injunction restraining the city from taking
such action. Over a week later, after a hearing on the matter, the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County refused to grant
a preliminary injunction restraining the city from dispossession -in
such a matter, apparently because the actions were a fait accom-
pli.119 The appellants immediately appealed this decision to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, asking the Supreme Court to grant
an immediate preliminary injunction, restraining dispossession by
the city until the court could decide whether the trial court had
erred. In other words, the appellants requested restoration of the
status quo before the "eviction," pending the final disposition of the
case. The Supreme Court refused to grant this immediate injunc-
tion, but three members dissented, filing an unreported opin-
ion.120 In the court's decision of the case on its merits, the appel-
lants' petition to the Supreme Court for an immediate injunction
pending review by that court was characterized as dangerous and
unknown.121 Only a bare majority of the court felt such an aver-
sion to issuing an immediate injunction pending review, however,
so that such a petition may prove successful in some situations.
In other words, three members of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court have indicated that the Court may issue what is, in essence,
a temporary restraining order.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued its final opinion
in Berman four months after the police had dispossessed the appel-
lants.122 The Court reversed the trial court's refusal to grant the
title to the land is at issue. See, e.g., Romano ex rel. Romano v. Loeb,
326 Pa. 272, 192 A. 100 (1937); O'Neill v. McDermott, 40 Luz. Leg. Reg. 38
(Pa. C.P. 1948); Howey v. Stolarik, 40 Luz. Leg. Reg. 40 (Pa. C.P. 1940);
Johnson v. Seitzinger, 40 Schuyl. Leg. Reg. 359 (Pa. C.P. 1937). On the
contrary, this section will propose an injunction forcing a landlord to
maintain his action before a magistrate.
118. 425 Pa. 13, 228 A.2d 189 (1967).
119. Id. at 14, 228 A.2d at 190.
120. Id. at 15, 228 A.2d at 191.
121. Id. at 20, 228 A.2d at 194.
122. Id. at 15, 228 A.2d at 191.
injunction and thereby enjoined the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment from interfering with appellants' rights until such rights
were "determined in a manner consistent with an orderly ad-
ministration of justice."'
1 23
The appellant in Berman was confronted with the burden of es-
tablishing that the lower court had committed an abuse of dis-
cretion and not merely an error. 124 In its per curiam opinion, the
Supreme Court said:
[T] he failure of the court below to insist that the police re-
sort to the available legal machinery rather than forci-
bly evicting appellants, thereby insuring the dignity of the
legal process, did amount to an abuse of discretion.'2 5
The discretion of the trial court is exercised when it determines
whether the plaintiff has proved the elements of his right to a pre-
liminary injunction:
1. the rights of the plaintiff are clear;
2. there is an urgent necessity to avoid injury for which
no compensation can be made; and
3. refusal of the injunction will result in greater injjry
than granting it would.
126
Since the trial court has a wide degree of discretion in determining
whether the facts sustain a finding of all of the above elements,
on an appeal from a decree which refuses, grants or con-
tinues a preliminary injunction, [the court] will look only
to see if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for
the action . . . and will not further consider the merits of
the case.127
Obviously, the Berman court, after reviewing the evidence, felt
that there were no reasonable grounds for the trial court's deci-
sion, and that on the contrary, the plaintiff had established the three
elements necessary to secure an injunction.
The plaintiffs in Berman had first attempted to secure an
ex parte injunction. Such an injunction, granted without a hearing
on motion of the plaintiff, is provided for in Rule 1531 of the Penn-
sylvania Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) A court shall issue a preliminary or special in-
junction only after written notice and hearing unless it ap-
pears to the satisfaction of the court that immediate and ir-
reparable injury will be sustained before notice can be
given or a hearing held, in which case the court may issue
a preliminary or special injunction without a hearing or
123. Id. at 17, 228 A.2d at 192.
124. See Rubin v. Bailey, 398 Pa. 271, 157 A.2d 882 (1960).
125. Berman v. City of Philadelphia, 425 Pa. 13, 15, 228 A.2d 189, 191
(1967).
126. These guidelines were established and discussed in Schwab v.
Pottstown Borough, 407 Pa. 531, 180 A.2d 921 (1962) (injunction refused
as plaintiff's injuries could be redressed).




without notice. In determining whether a preliminary
or special injunction should be granted and whether notice
or a hearing should be required, the court may act on the
basis of the averments of the pleadings or petition and may
consider affidavits ... or any other proof....
(b) ... [A] preliminary or special injunction shall be
granted only if
(1) the plaintiff files a bond...
(c) ...
(d) An injunction granted without notice to the de-
fendant shall be deemed dissolved unless a hearing on
the continuance of the injunction is held within five (5)
days of the granting of the injunction ... 128
The key words in this Rule are "immediate and irreparable injury,"
as indicated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when it said:
The awarding of a preliminary injunction without notice
is somewhat like judgment and execution before trial, for
temporarily the defendant is damnatus inauditus. It is
to be resorted to only from a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences that cannot be repaired under
any standard of compensation. It ought never to be granted
except in a clear case of an invaded right, to prevent irrep-
arable mischief .... 129
When ruling on a motion for an ex parte injunction the trial
judge by necessity has almost unlimited discretion. A hearing on
a petition for a preliminary injunction can be scheduled before an
appellate court could review the correctness of the decision regard-
ing the preliminary ex parte injunction. For that reason there are
many appellate court opinions discussing preliminary injunctions
but there are almost none discussing preliminary ex parte injunc-
tions. However, appellate decisions have established the rule that a
court may grant an injunction preserving the status quo pending a
final hearing on the matter,130 and appellate decisions have de-
fined to an extent the immediate and irreparable injury requisite
for a preliminary ex parte injunction. Thus, trial court judges do
have definite guidelines to use in applying Rule 1531.11
128. PA. R. Civ. P. 1531. The type of injunction contemplated here is
frequently referred to as a "temporary restraining order." Cf. FED. R.
Crv. P. 65(b).
129. Kittaning Brewing Co. v. American Natural Gas Co., 224 Pa. 129,
130, 73 A. 174, 175 (1909) (dictum). See also Commonwealth v. Guild
Theatre Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 248 A.2d 45 (1968).
130. See, e.g., Black Lick Manufacturing Co. v. Saltsburg Gas Co.,
139 Pa. 448 (1891); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400,
52 A.2d 317 (1947) and authorities cited therein; Taylor v. Sauer, 40 Pa.
Super. 229 (1909).
131. PA. R. Civ. P. 1531.
In light of the decision in Berman v. City of Philadelphia,13 2 it is
submitted that a preliminary ex parte injunction is an appropriate
remedy for a tenant who is threatened by a landlord's self-help
tactics. Although the person sought to be restrained in Berman
was the city rather than a landlord, the actions did involve a type of
eviction.1 33 Although police action was enjoined in reliance on due
process requirements, it is submitted that governmental action
would be justified in such a situation before action by a private
party. This is especially true in light of the definition the courts
have developed for forcible entry. In other words, the use of
forcible self-help by the police, although it may violate due process,
is certainly preferable to the use of forcible self-help by private
landlords both in terms of the interest to be protected and type of
resistance likely to be provoked. Although due process was used in
Berman to restrain the police, it is submitted that the policy of pre-
venting disturbances of the peace is an equally strong argument for
restraining the private landlord. Thus, although Berman may be
factually distinguished from any case wherein the self-help methods
of a landlord are sought to be enjoined, it is submitted that the prin-
ciple of law articulated in Berman is applicable to both situations:
a person in possession of property should not be dispossessed until
his rights are "determined in a manner consistent with an orderly
administration of justice.'
u 4
A preliminary ex parte injunction restraining a landlord from
using self-help must meet the requisites of all such injunctions. Be-
fore such an injunction is granted it must be established that
1. the plaintiff's rights are clear;
2. there is an urgent necessity to avoid injury for which no
compensation can be made; and
3. refusal of the injunction will result in greater injury than
granting it would.'"
The first element is unclear; 136 the Berman court said specifically
that it was not concerned with the zoning controversy underlying
the police action. 137 It may be argued therefore that this first req-
132. 425 Pa. 13, 228 A.2d 189 (1967). See discussion at text accom-
panying notes 115-124 supra.
133. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered the appellees to "re-
sort to the available legal machinery rather than forcibly evicting appel-
lants." Berman v. City of Philadelphia, 425 Pa. 13, 15, 228 A.2d 189, 191
(1967).
134. Id. at 17, 228 A.2d at 192. The Court asked rhetorically: "Are we
to say that because the police have the ability to act faster than the courts,
the courts are powerless to act?" Id.
135. Schwab v. Pottstown Borough, 407 Pa. 531, 180 A.2d 921 (1962).
136. In an analysis of this element, Judge Bowman of the Common-
wealth Court has said: "It would appear that this pronouncement is
little more than an expression of caution that courts should exercise this
equitable power with restraint." Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Barnes & Tucker Company, 1 Com. Ct. 552 (Pa. 1971).




uisite merely refers to the plaintiff's righs regarding the second
and third requisites. However, in the alternative, it is submitted
that previous discussion has shown that a tenant has a clear right
to have his landlord evict him by judicial process only. 38 The sec-
ond element of the action is probably the most important; it is sim-
ply a restatement of the traditional equity rule of "no adequate
remedy at law." As long as Pennsylvania subscribes to the rule
that a landlord cannot be held civilly liable for his self-help evic-
tion methods, any tenant dispossessed without judicial process can-
not be compensated for any injuries suffered because of the dis-
possession, and therefore has no adequate remedy save the in-
junction. As regards the third element, it is submitted that a ten-
ant suddenly faced with eviction, having no place to live, will suf-
fer much greater damage than a landlord forced to use judicial
process to redress his grievances.
In light of the foregoing discussion it is submitted that a
tenant threatened with dispossession should be afforded the remedy
of a preliminary ex parte injunction immediately restraining the
landlord from resorting to such action and forcing him to seek his
statutory remedy. Although Pennsylvania authority supporting
such a rule is scarce if not non-existent, 13 9 the granting of such
an injunction by the courts can be easily accomplished within the
existing and the traditional doctrines of equity practice.
V. CONCLUSION
A Pennsylvania tenant faced with the prospect of dispossession
without judicial process has no legal remedy. It may be possible for
him to initiate criminal proceedings to subject his landlord to crimi-
nal liability for forcible entry, but such a proceeding would not
compensate the tenant in any way and should not be encouraged
if the motive is merely revenge. At any rate, the paucity of ap-
pellate decisions indicates that criminal proceedings against the
landlord rarely result in conviction. A tenant cannot recover in a
civil proceeding if the landlord acted reasonably, although Penn-
sylvania may someday join the growing number of jurisdictions
permitting such recovery. Finally, the right of a tenant to enjoin
the self-help actions of his landlord has yet to be recognized.
138. See text accompanying notes 85-109 and notes 129-131 supra.
139. No reported cases have been found. However, within the
knowledge of this author, two Courts of Common Pleas have granted
such relief to a tenant. See Morrison v. Berney, No. 2838 May Term 1970
(Bucks County); Rickrode v. Nelson, No. 2 Jan. Term 1971 (Cumberland
County).
This Comment has attempted to present arguments to counter
the great weight of Pennsylvania authority denying a remedy to a
tenant who has been dispossessed without judicial process. As
indicated in the preceding paragraph, criminal remedies are not
favored. However, it is submitted that a landlord who ignores his
legal remedies should be held civilly liable for his actions in the
same manner as determined in those cases discussed in Part III of
this Comment. The tenant's possible status as a wrongdoer should
not completely bar his recovery from a person who has done legal
injury to him, especially since the landlord may use the legal proc-
ess to redress any grievances resulting from his tenant's actions.
The availability of legal process to the landlord provides the
basis for issuing an injunction forcing him to use such process. It
is submitted that an order restraining a person from personally re-
dressing his grievances and instead causing him to use judicial
process for such redress is neither novel nor unreasonable. Rather,
it allows courts to function in their historic role.
ROBERT W. BARTON
